Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has reaffirmed his decision to veto the appointment of Pablo Lucas as the General Council of the Judiciary (CGPJ) president. This move has stirred significant political debate. The veto highlights Spanish politics’ unique and challenging landscape, where consensus is often hard to achieve. Despite various efforts to reach an agreement on the leadership of the CGPJ, Sánchez’s firm stance underscores his commitment to maintaining the independence and integrity of Spain’s judicial system. This decision reflects the complexities of balancing political interests with the principles of justice and governance in Spain.
Bolaños reaffirms his veto to prevent Pablo Lucas from presiding over the CGPJ despite being the only one who would achieve consensus.
A significant portion of the twenty General Council of the Judiciary (CGPJ) members convened yesterday in Madrid for a plenary session intended to address pressing procedural matters. However, the session only reaffirmed the ongoing deadlock between the two factions—ten progressive and ten conservative councilors—regarding appointing the institution’s president.
Throughout August, continuous discussions have occurred between members of both camps, aimed at breaking the stalemate before the Judicial Year’s Opening Ceremony, presided over by the King, on September 5. Yet, frustration and resignation have taken hold among the Council members, as the impasse over endorsing one of the seven magistrates initially identified as viable candidates has proven impossible.
Sources within the conservative sector have voiced concerns about the government’s perceived inflexibility, particularly pointing to Minister of the Presidency and Justice Félix Bolaños. Bolaños has steadfastly advocated for High Court judges Pilar Teso and Ana Ferrer—both seen as closely aligned with the Executive—to preside over the CGPJ and the Supreme Court. Despite multiple rounds of voting before August, neither judge has garnered the necessary twelve votes.
This situation is particularly striking to the conservative bloc, given that Pablo Lucas Murillo de la Cueva, a judge of progressive leanings, continues to face a government-imposed veto. According to these sources, Lucas is the only progressive camp candidate capable of securing enough consensus among the PP-backed judges to lead the institution. They argue that the veto against Pablo Lucas is perpetuating the deadlock and fostering growing unrest within a Council that has yet to begin functioning effectively. The conservative faction remains resolute, with no signs of the cracks needed to allow Ferrer or Teso to secure the necessary votes.
The conservative sector attributes Pilar Teso’s “strong dependence” on Cándido Conde-Pumpido, the president of the Constitutional Court, suggesting that her appointment would effectively result in a “camouflaged presidency of the Supreme Court,” with Conde-Pumpido as the real power behind the scenes. According to these sources, this is a ‘sine qua non’ condition imposed by the government to ensure that both the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court “move in the same direction,” particularly concerning the 123 appointments required to reshape the High Court Chambers, the Superior Courts of Justice, and the presidencies of the Provincial Courts over the next three years. The government’s interest, they claim, is not in achieving consensus through a balanced selection of magistrates but in thoroughly overhauling Spain’s judicial leadership by appointing like-minded, “preferred,” and trustworthy magistrates in every possible domain.
Ana Ferrer’s situation is similar. Recently, she has distanced herself from the majority decisions and stances within the Criminal Chamber, which some court sources interpret as an attempt to “earn favor” with the socialist government after several years of being off La Moncloa’s radar. Even if Ferrer does not become the president of the CGPJ, she is reportedly Bolaños’ preferred candidate for the presidency of the Criminal Chamber. This position will open up when Manuel Marchena steps down this November after two consecutive terms.
In July, Ferrer notably disagreed with the rest of the Criminal Chamber by arguing that Carles Puigdemont, the president of Junts, should be granted amnesty even for misappropriation of public funds. She based her argument on a rationale similar to that employed by the left-wing majority of the Constitutional Court, which supported a covert pardon for several former Andalusian Government officials convicted in the ERE fraud case. Ferrer contended that failing to amnesty Puigdemont for embezzlement “defies all logical boundaries.”
A recent development causing concern among Supreme Court judges is the complaint filed by Carles Puigdemont with the General Council of the Judiciary (CGPJ) against Judge Pablo Llarena. Puigdemont accuses Llarena of an alleged delay in resolving his appeals against the decision to deny him amnesty. This situation has raised alarms among some, who now question what assurances exist that a CGPJ, potentially led by a figure sympathetic to the government’s influence, would not initiate disciplinary action against a judge like Llarena, who is simply performing his duties with independent judgment.
The newly established CGPJ began its term on July 25, following a last-minute agreement between the PSOE and the PP, spurred by pressure from the European Commission after more than five years of unprecedented gridlock in its renewal. On that date, the Council proposed Supreme Court magistrates Esperanza Córdoba, Antonio del Moral, Ana Ferrer, Ángeles Huet, Carmen Lamela, Pablo Lucas, and Pilar Teso as candidates for the presidency, but none has yet secured the required majority of twelve votes.
Pablo Lucas, the only progressive candidate deemed acceptable by the conservative members of the Council, brings significant experience from his tenure in the Supreme Court. He holds a law degree from the University of Deusto and a PhD from the University of Bologna. He has served as a judge in the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court since 2001. Since 2013, he has been a member of its Governing Chamber, elected by his peers, and since 2009, he has provided prior judicial oversight of the National Intelligence Centre by appointment of the CGPJ.
Lucas is a recognized authority on issues such as the right to data protection, critical aspects of the constitutional order of the Judiciary, and the legal framework of political parties and elections. His reputation in the Supreme Court is marked by his independent judgment, even under pressure from judicial bodies aligned with the government.
According to some sources, this independence is precisely why Moncloa favors female judges with overt political affiliations, who may appear more amenable to government directives. Additionally, Lucas has served as Deputy Director General of Publications and Documentation at the Centre for Constitutional Studies and was a member of the Central Electoral Board. His experience also includes leading the Office of the President of the CGPJ, providing him with in-depth knowledge of the functioning and organization of the governing body of judges.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the CGPJ, and why is its presidency important?
The General Council of the Judiciary (CGPJ) is Spain’s governing body for judges, overseeing the judiciary’s functioning and ensuring its independence. The presidency of the CGPJ is crucial because it influences the direction and management of the judicial system, including key appointments and decisions that can impact the interpretation and application of the law.
Who is Pablo Lucas, and why was he considered for the CGPJ presidency?
Pablo Lucas is a respected judge with extensive experience in the Supreme Court. He holds degrees from the University of Deusto and the University of Bologna and has served in the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court since 2001. His candidacy for the CGPJ presidency was seen as a balanced option, with his reputation for independence making him a viable candidate to bridge the gap between the progressive and conservative members of the Council.
Why did Félix Bolaños veto Pablo Lucas’s candidacy?
Félix Bolaños, Spain’s Minister of the Presidency and Justice, vetoed Pablo Lucas’s candidacy due to concerns about Lucas’s independence and potential lack of alignment with the government’s interests. The veto reflects the government’s desire to ensure that the CGPJ is led by someone perceived as more aligned with its policies, particularly concerning the judiciary’s role and influence.
How has the veto impacted the CGPJ’s ability to reach a consensus?
Pablo Lucas’s veto has deepened the deadlock within the CGPJ, making it difficult for the Council to achieve the required majority to appoint a new president. The stalemate has contributed to growing frustration and a sense of resignation among Council members, as efforts to reach a consensus have been unsuccessful.
How has the conservative sector responded to the veto?
The conservative sector within the CGPJ has expressed significant concern over the veto, viewing it as a political move undermining the Council’s independence. They argue that the government’s insistence on appointing a more politically aligned candidate, such as Pilar Teso or Ana Ferrer, threatens the impartiality of the judiciary and could lead to undue influence over vital judicial decisions.
What are the implications of the ongoing deadlock for the Spanish judiciary?
The ongoing deadlock in appointing a CGPJ president seriously affects the Spanish judiciary. It hampers the Council’s ability to function effectively, delays necessary judicial appointments, and risks undermining public confidence in the judiciary’s independence. The situation also highlights broader concerns about politicizing judicial appointments in Spain.
Conclusion
Conclusion About The reaffirmation by Félix Bolaños of the veto against Pablo Lucas’s candidacy for the General Council of the Judiciary (CGPJ) presidency underscores the deep-seated divisions within Spain’s judicial and political landscape. This move, aimed at ensuring the appointment of a more government-aligned figure, has exacerbated the existing deadlock within the CGPJ, making consensus increasingly elusive. The situation highlights the complex interplay between political interests and judicial independence in Spain, raising concerns about the potential long-term impact on the judiciary’s integrity. As the CGPJ remains at an impasse, the challenges of achieving a balanced and impartial leadership that can restore confidence in the judicial system remain unresolved.
